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Abstract
We present two new constructions of quantum hash functions: the
first based on expander graphs and the second based on extractor
functions and estimate the amount of randomness that is needed to
construct them. We also propose a keyed quantum hash function
based on extractor function that can be used in quantum message au-
thentication codes and assess its security in a limited attacker model.
1 Introduction
Quantum hash functions are similar to classical (cryptographic) hash func-
tions and their security is guaranteed by physical laws. However, their con-
struction and applications are not fully understood.
Quantum hash functions were first implicitly introduced in Buhrman et al.
[6] as quantum fingerprinting. Then Gavinsky and Ito [10] noticed that
quantum fingerprinting can be used as cryptoprimitive. However, binary
quantum hash function are not very suitable if we need group operations
(and group is not Z2k . For example, several classical hash functions were
proposed that use groups, e.g. by Charles et al. [7] and by Tillich and Ze´mor
[18].
Ablayev and Ablayev [1] gave a definition and construction of non-binary
quantum hash functions. Ziatdinov [21] showed how to generalize quantum
hashing to arbitrary finite groups. Recently, Vasiliev [19] showed how quan-
tum hash functions are connected with ǫ-biased sets.
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Quantum hash functions map a classical message into a Hilbert space.
Such space should be as small as possible, so eavesdropper can’t read a lot of
information about classical message (this is guaranteed by physical laws as
Holevo-Nayak’s theorem states). But images of different messages should be
as far apart as possible, so recipient can check that hash differ or not with
high probability. We measure this distance using an absolute value of scalar
product of hashes of different messages.
Informally speaking, to define a quantum hash function we need some
random data. Then our input is mixed with this random data. Quantum
parallelism allows us to do it in different subspaces simultaneously, so result-
ing hash is small. For example, random subsets suffice (for Zm) [3], random
codes suffice (for Zn2 ) [6], random automorphisms suffice (for any finite group)
[21]. Vasiliev et al. [20] used some heuristics to find best subsets of Zm.
However, typically the amount of randomness that is needed to con-
struct such quantum hash functions is large (about O(log2 |G|)). We re-
duce amount of randomness needed to define quantum hash function to
O(log |G| log log |G|) in expander-based quantum hash function.
Extractor-based quantum hash function allows us to introduce a notion
of keyed quantum hash function. It can be used, for example, in quantum
message authentication codes. Unlike [5] and [4] we use classical keys and
authenticate classical messages. Unlike [8] we authenticate whole messages,
not single bits. However, our security analysis has only limited attacker.
It is known that walk on expander graph gives results very similar to
random sampling. We show that walks on expander graphs give a quantum
hash functions in section 4. Structure of these quantum hash functions is
somewhat different from previous versions.
Extractor is a generalization of expander graph. In the section 6 we
propose a keyed quantum hash function based on extractors and assess its
security against limited attacker.
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2 Definitions
Let us recall some basic definitions.
2.1 Statistics
We use a standard definition of the statistical distance.
Definition 1 (Statistical distance, cited by Shaltiel [16]). We say that two
distributions F and G are ǫ-close, if for every event A, |Pr[F ∈ A]−Pr[G ∈
A]| ≤ ǫ.
The support of a distribution X is Supp(X) = {x : Pr[X = x] > 0}.
The uniform distribution over {0, 1}m is denoted by Um and we say that
X is ǫ-close to uniform if it is ǫ-close to Um.
We denote that distribution F is ǫ-close to distribution G by F
ǫ
≈ G.
We also use a standard definition of the min-entropy.
Definition 2 (Min-entropy, cited by Shaltiel [16]). Let X be a distribution.
The min-entropy of X is H∞(X) = minx∈Supp(X) log 1Pr[X=x] .
2.2 Quantum model of computation
We use the following model of computation.
Recall that a qubit |Ψ〉 is a superposition of basis states |0〉 and |1〉, i.e.
|Ψ〉 = α |0〉+ β |1〉, where α, β ∈ C and |α|2 + |β|2 = 1. So, qubit |Ψ〉 ∈ H2,
where H2 is a two-dimensional Hilbert complex space.
Let s ≥ 1. We denote 2s-dimensional Hilbert complex space by (H2)⊗s:
(H2)⊗s = H2 ⊗H2 ⊗ . . .⊗H2 = H2
s
We denote a state |a1〉 |a2〉 . . . |an〉, each ai ∈ {0, 1}, by |i〉, where i is
a1a2 . . . an in binary. For example, we denote |1〉 |1〉 |0〉 by |6〉. Usually it is
clear, which space this state belongs to.
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Computation is done by multiplying a state by a unitary matrix: |Ψ1〉 =
U |Ψ0〉, where U is a unitary matrix: U
†U = I, U † is the conjugate matrix
and I is the identity matrix.
The density matrix of a mixed state {pi, |ψi〉} is a matrix ρ =
∑
i pi |ψi〉 〈ψi|.
A density matrix belongs to Hom((H2)⊗s, (H2)⊗s), the set of linear transfor-
mations from (H2)⊗s to (H2)⊗s.
At the end of computation state is measured by POVM (Positive Operator
Valued Measure). A POVM on a (H2)⊗s is a collection {Ei} of positive semi-
definite operators Ei : Hom((H
2)⊗m, (H2)⊗m)→ Hom((H2)⊗m, (H2)⊗m) that
sums up to the identity transformation, i.e. Ei  0 and
∑
iEi = I. Applying
a POVM {Ei} on a density matrix ρ results in answer i with probability
Tr(Eiρ).
2.3 Character theory
Definition 3 (Character of the group). Let G be a group with unity e and
operation ◦.
The character χ : G→ C of the group G is a homomorphism of G to C:
for any g, g′ ∈ G it holds that χ(g ◦ g′) = χ(g)χ(g′).
2.4 Graphs
Definition 4 (Expander graph, cited by Hoory et al. [14]). Let the graph
Γ = (V,E) with set of vertices V and set of edges E be fixed. Self-loops and
multiple edges are allowed.
Graph Γ is the d-regular graph if all vertices have the same degree d; i.e.
each vertex is incident to exactly d edges.
Adjacency matrix of the graph A = A(Γ) is an n× n matrix whose (u, v)
entry is the number of edges between vertex u and vertex v.
Let λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥ λn be eigenvalues of matrix A = A(Γ), i.e. for
some vi it holds that Avi = λivi. We refer to the eigenvalues of A(Γ) as the
spectrum of the graph Γ.
Given a d-regular graph Γ with n vertices and spectrum λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥ . . . ≥
λn we denote λ(Γ) = max{|λ2|, |λn|}.
We call the graph Γ a (d, λ)-expander graph if Γ is d-regular and has
λ(Γ) = λ.
Every expander graph can be converted to a bipartite expander graph.
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One can just take two copies of vertex sets and change original edges to go
from one copy to another. Generalization of these bipartite expander graphs
is extractor graphs. The extractor graph is a bipartite graph where size
of components can be different. An extractor can also be defined in terms
of function that maps pair of first component vertex and edge to second
component vertex.
Definition 5 ((Seeded) extractor, cited by Shaltiel [16]). A function E :
{0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, ǫ)-extractor if for every distribution X
over {0, 1}n with H∞(X) ≥ k, E(X, Y ) is ǫ-close to uniform (where Y is
distributed like Ud and is independent of X).
Sometimes we use extractor functions that map one (arbitrary) set to
other: E : G× {0, 1}d → H . These functions can be thought of as bipartite
graphs with vertices (G,H). In this case we denote uniform distribution on
H by UH .
We also use extractors against quantum storage. Informally, their out-
put is ǫ-close to uniform and no quantum circuit operating on b qubits can
distinguish output from uniform.
Definition 6 (Extractor against quantum storage, cited by Ta-Shma [17]).
An (n, b) quantum encoding is a collection {ρ(x)}x∈{0,1}n of density matrices
ρ(x) ∈ (H2)⊗b.
A boolean test T ǫ-distinguishes a distribution D1 from a distribution D2
if |Prx1∈D1 [T (x1) = 1]− Prx2∈D2 [T (x2) = 1]| ≥ ǫ.
We say D1 is ǫ-indistinguishable from D2 if no boolean POVM can ǫ-
distinguish D1 from D2.
A function X : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m is a (k, b, ǫ) strong extractor
against quantum storage, if for any distribution X ⊆ {0, 1}n with H∞(X) ≥
k and every (n, b) quantum encoding {ρ(x)}, Ut ◦ E(X,Ut) ◦ ρ(X) is ǫ-
indistinguishable from Ut+m ◦ ρ(X).
3 Quantum hash functions
Informally, quantum hash function is a function that maps large classical in-
put to a small quantum (hash) state such that two requirements are satisfied:
(1) it is hard to restore input given the hash state and (2) it is easy to check
with high probability that inputs for two quantum hash states are equal or
different.
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It is easy to meet the first requirement for a constant hash size. One
can simply take a qubit |Ψ(w)〉 = α(w) |0〉+ β |1〉 and encode the input in a
fractional part of α. But then the second requirement is not satisfied.
It is easy to meet the second requirement for a hash size that is logarithmic
in input size. One can simply map the input to the corresponding base state:
|Ψ(i)〉 = |i〉. However, then the first requirement is not satisfied.
Let us give the formal definition.
Definition 7 (Quantum hash function, cited by Ablayev and Ablayev [2]).
For δ ∈ (0, 1/2) we call a function ψ : X → (H2)⊗s a δ-resistant func-
tion if for any pair w,w′ of different elements of X their images are almost
orthogonal:
|〈ψ(w)|ψ(w′)〉| ≤ δ. (1)
We call a map ψ : X → (H2)⊗s an δ-resistant (K; s) quantum hash
function if ψ is a δ-resistant function, and log |X| = K.
Quantum hash function maps inputs of length K to (quantum) outputs
of length s. If K ≫ s any attacker can’t get a lot of information by Holevo-
Nayak theorem [15].
The equality of two hashes can be checked using, for example, well-known
SWAP-test [12].
All our hash functions have the following form:
|ψ(g)〉 =
t∑
i=1
χ(ki(g)) |i〉 , (2)
where g is an element of some group G, {ki, i = 1, . . . , t}, ki : G → H is a
set of mappings from group G with operation ◦ to group H with operation
• and χ : H → C is a character of the group H .
For example, the group G can be thought of as Z2n with group operation
+, then elements of G can be encoded as binary strings {0, 1}n of length n
3.1 Why groups?
We use groups in quantum hash functions of form (2), not just arbitrary sets,
because groups have nice structure. We can combine elements of group and
we can inverse them.
Several classical cryptoprimitives were proposed that use groups, e.g. by
Charles et al. [7] and by Tillich and Ze´mor [18].
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4 Expanders for Quantum Hashing
As noted in Section 1, randomly chosen parameters with high probability
lead to a quantum hash function. We replace this process with random walk
on expander graph that is known to be close to uniform sampling.
In this section we fix a group G with group operation ⊙ and unity e.
Let Γ = (V,E) be an extractor - i.e. d-regular graph with spectral gap λ.
We label vertices V of graph Γ with messages (i.e. elements of group G).
Let us randomly choose one vertex and perform a random walk of length
t starting from it. Denote vertices that occured in this walk by sj . Parameter
t depend on security parameter ǫ of quantum hash function and we derive
its value in theorem 1.
It is easy to note that such construction requires only td+ log |G| bits of
randomness.
Let us define the expander quantum hash function.
Definition 8. The expander quantum hash function ΨΓ,t(g) maps elements
of G to unitary transformations in m-dimensional Hilbert space (H2)⊗m:
ΨΓ,t(g) =
t∑
k=1
χ(g ⊙ sk) |k〉 .
If we choose Γ and t appropriately, ΨΓ,t is a quantum hash function.
Theorem 1. For any δ ∈ (0; 1
2
) the function ΨΓ,t is a δ-resistant (log |G|; log t)
quantum hash function if t > O( log |G|
δ
).
Proof. Let us fix some t.
〈Ψ†(g)|ΨΓ,t(g′)〉 =
t∑
k=1
〈χ∗(g ⊙ sk)|χ(g′ ⊙ sk)〉 = |
t∑
k=1
χ(s−1k ⊙ g
−1 ⊙ g′ ⊙ sk)|.
Denoting g′′ = g−1 ⊙ g′, we get
〈Ψ†(g)|ΨΓ,t(g′)〉 = |
t∑
k=1
χ(s−1k ⊙ g
′′ ⊙ sk)|,
and xk = s
−1
k ⊙ g
′′ ⊙ sk is also some random walk on graph Γ.
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Let G be a weighted graph with eigenvalue gap ǫ = 1 − λ and non-
uniformity ν. Let random walk on G starts in distribution q and has sta-
tionary distribution π. Then Chernoff bound for expander graphs [11] states
that for any positive integer n and for any γ > 0:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
f(xi)− nEπf
∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
]
≤ 4Nq exp
[
−
(
γ
||f ||∞
)2
ǫ
20n
]
. (3)
Here we have graph weights wij =
1
d
for all i, j and wx = 1, thus ν = 1
and π(x) = 1
V
. Initial distribution q is uniform distribution over G, therefore
Nq = 1. Function f(x) = χ(x) obviously has ||f ||∞ ≤ 1. We also bound (3)
with some small probability, e.g. 1|G| . Then (3) becomes
Pr
[∣∣ t∑
i=1
f(xi)− tEπf
∣∣ ≥ γ] ≤ 4 exp [− γ2ǫ
20t
]
≤
1
|G|
.
Solving with respect to t gives us:
t ≥
20
(1− λ)δ
ln(4|G|) = O(log |G|).
If we make a random walk of length t = O(log |G|), we will get a quantum
hash function with high probability.
So, construction of this quantum hash function requires only O(log |G|)
bits of randomness if underlying expander graph is chosen carefully.
Corollary 1. For all n and δ ∈ (0; 1
2
) there exist a δ-resistant (logn; log t+1)
quantum hash function with t ≥ 160
√
2
3δ
ln(4n).
Proof. We use Margulis construction [14] of (8; 5
√
2
8
) expander graph with n2
vertices and character of group Z2n.
5 Extractors for Quantum Hashing
Definition 9. Let Ext : G× {0, 1}d → H be a (k; ǫ) extractor function. Let
t and si ∈ G, i ∈ {1, . . . , t} be parameters. We choose them in Theorem 2.
Denote S = {si}.
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We define a quantum hash function Ψ based on extractor Ext as follows.
ΨExt,t,S(g) =
t∑
i=1
2d∑
j=1
χ(Ext(g ◦ si, j)) |j〉 |i〉 .
Intuitively, we start from several vertices and move along all incident
edges simultaneously.
Parameters t, si depend on security parameter ǫ. Let us choose it.
Theorem 2. If Ext is a (k, ǫ) extractor, parameter t > log |H|+1
2ǫ2
||χ||∞ and
si are chosen according to distribution X with H∞(X) ≥ k, then ΨExt is an
ǫ-resistant (n; d+ log t) quantum hash function.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove that for any g′ 6= g
∣∣∣∣〈ΨExt,t,S(g)|ΨExt,t,S(g′)〉
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣
t∑
i=1
2d∑
j=1
χ(Ext(g ◦ si, j)
−1 • Ext(g′ ◦ si, j))
∣∣∣∣ ≤
≤
t∑
i=1
2d∑
j=1
|χ(Ext(g ◦ si, j)
−1 • Ext(g′ ◦ si, j))| < ǫ.
Define Xi to be a distribution of (random variable) si. Let Yi be a random
variable EUd[|χ(Ext(Xi, Ud))|].
It is easy to see that Yi ≤ ||χ||∞ = 1.
Then by Hoeffding’s inequality:
Pr
[∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
i=1
Yi − E
[1
t
t∑
i=1
Yi
]∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
]
≤ 2 exp
(
− 2tǫ2
)
.
Bounding this probability by 1|H| and solving with respect to t gives
t ≥
log |H|+ 1
2ǫ2
.
Note that selecting parameters S requires O(log |G| × log |H|) random
bits.
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Corollary 2. For every ǫ > 0, α > 0 and all positive integers n, k there
exist an ǫ-resistant (n; log t+ d+ 1) quantum hash function, where t ≥ m+1
2ǫ2
,
d = O(logn + log(1/ǫ)) and m ≥ (1− α)k.
Proof. Guruswami et al. [13] proved that for every α > 0 and all positive
integers n, k and all ǫ > 0 there is an explicit construction of a (k; ǫ) extractor
E : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m with d = O(logn+log(1/ǫ)) andm ≥ (1−α)k.
Quantum hash function ΨE,t is the required function.
6 Keyed quantum hash functions
Classical message authentication codes (MAC) have wide range of applica-
tions. They are defined as a triple of algorithms: G that generates a key, S
that uses the key and the message to generate a tag of the message, and V
that uses the key, the message and the tag to verify message integrity.
Formally, G : 1n → K, where n is a a security parameter and K is a set
of all possible keys, S : K ×X → T , where X is a set of messages and T is
a set of tags and V : K ×X × T → {Acc,Rej}.
We require the following property for MAC to be a sound system:
∀n, ∀x ∈ X : k = G(1n), V
(
k, x, S(k, x)
)
= Acc, (4)
i.e. that verifier always accepts a generated tag.
We also require that MAC is a secure system and for any adversary A
that can query MAC:
∀n, k /∈ Query(A), (x, t)← A(S),Pr
[
V (k, x, t) = Acc
]
≤ negl(n), (5)
i.e. any adversary that can query MAC outputs correct tag for some key
that was not queried and some message with negligible probability.
One classical construction of MAC is hash-based MAC (also known as
keyed hash functions). Basically, keyed hash function is a function H(k, x),
such that H(k, ·) is a cryptographic hash function for every k. It is easy to
see that such function can be used as MAC.
With the same considerations as in Section 3, we define these algorithms
to be the following.
Definition 10. An (ǫ, δ) keyed quantum hash function is a quantum function
S, such that
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A function S accepts a key k ∈ K and a message x ∈ X and outputs a
quantum tag for x: S : K ×X → T = (H2)⊗t.
We require soundness, i.e. tags should be different for different messages
under the same key.
∀k ∈ K, ∀x ∈ X, ∀y 6= x : 〈S(k, x)|S(k, y)〉 < ǫ.
For x = y we get 〈S(k, x)|S(k, x)〉 = 1.
We also require unforgeability:
∀k ∈ K, k /∈ Query(A), (x, t)← A(S),Pr
[
〈t|S(k, x)〉 ≥ ǫ)
]
≤ δ,
where A is arbitrary attacker that can query S and (Query)(A) is a set of
queries made.
Informally, keyed quantum hash function outputs a tag for a message. If
someone changes a message, then the verification step fails with high proba-
bility. If an attacker Eve can query a keyed quantum hash function, access
to a function doesn’t help her to forge a tag for some message with some
(unqueried) key.
Theorem 3. Let us define an extractor-based keyed quantum hash function
as follows. Let Ext : {0, 1}n×{0, 1}d → {0, 1}m be a (k, b, ǫ) extractor against
b quantum storage and b > r(d+ log t) .
Then a function
ΨExt(key, g) =
t∑
i=1
2d∑
j=1
χ(Ext(g ◦ key ◦ si, j)) |j〉 |i〉
is a (ǫ; ǫ+ ǫ2
s+1) keyed quantum hash function secure against an attacker A
with access to r queries to ΨExt.
Proof. We have to prove two claims. First, for any k, x and x′ 6= x, it
holds that 〈ΨExt(k, x)|ΨExt(k, x
′)〉 < ǫ. Second, for any attacker A and any
k /∈ Query(A) attacker output x, t such that 〈t|ΨExt(k, x)〉 ≥ ǫ with negligible
probability.
The first claim is implied by Theorem 2.
To prove the second claim we note that access to hash function doesn’t
help attacker to output correct tag. Proof by contradiction. Suppose A to
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be such attacker. Then we can distinguish between Ext(X,Ud) and Um using
a r(log t+ d) qubits. But r(log t + d) < b that contradicts the fact that Ext
is an extractor against b quantum storage.
Then attacker should output the tag without access to hash function.
This is equal to outputting a state that is close to correct tag. Then the
probability of correct guessing p is a ratio of the volume of sphere with
radius ǫ to the volume of the whole space:
p =
cǫ2
s+1
c(1 + ǫ)2s+1
≤ ǫ2
s+1.
Corollary 3. For all positive integers k, n and all c > 0 there exist a
(N−c; 2N−c) keyed quantum hash function.
Proof. De and Vidick [9] proved that for every α, c > 0 there exist an explicit
(αN, b,N−c) extractor E : {0, 1}N × {0, 1}d → {0, 1}m against b quantum
storage with d = O(log4 n) and m = Ω(αN − b).
7 Open problems
Groups that we considered here and all constructions known to us use finite
groups or sets and hash input strings of finite lengths.
Problem 1. Can quantum hash functions be constructed for infinite groups?
On the one hand, even one qubit can store arbitrary length binary string.
On the other hand, the measurement of one qubit can’t result in more than
one classical bit of information.
And “dual” question about infinite strings.
Problem 2. Can quantum hash functions work on infinite input strings (i.e.
{0, 1}∗)?
This problem seems to be easier, but it probably requires careful analysis.
Another interesting line of research would be improving keyed quantum
hash function.
Problem 3. Can keyed quantum hash function be secure against an attacker
with unlimited number of queries?
12
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